Prof. Eugene Gholz from the University of Notre Dame will speak at the MIT Security Studies Program's Wednesday Seminar.

Summary/Abstract:
The possibility that the People’s Republic of China might use military force to try to reunify with Taiwan increasingly worries analysts, especially as China’s military investment increases and the political relationship between the PRC (China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) deteriorates. Much of the military analysis of the relationship focuses on invasion scenarios, while a blockade is often casually discussed as a “less risky” way that China could use force to compel Taiwan to capitulate even if an invasion might not succeed. This paper points out some undesirable features of a traditional blockade in which China tries to interdict shipping approaching Taiwan, particularly by deploying the PRC’s surface fleet and submarines, and then builds a Monte Carlo simulation model of an alternative Chinese concept of blockade operations using stand-off missile strikes on ports to diminish cargo throughput to Taiwan. The military campaign analysis results suggest that China likely can substantially suppress Taiwan’s trade without risking its scarce and expensive fleet and with relatively low escalation risk. Though militarily successful blockades have rarely achieved all their political goals, that is partly due to targets’ preparation and resilience. We offer suggestions for Taiwan to build resilience and thereby reduce the probability of this potentially militarily effective concept of blockade operations.