SSP Wednesday Seminar with speaker Eric Min, Assistant Professor of Political Science,  UCLA.

When, why, and how do belligerents choose to negotiate in the midst of war? I argue that wartime negotiations are an underappreciated and highly strategic activity that not only help to settle wars, but also to manage, fight, and potentially win them. I outline a theory of wartime negotiations that explains when negotiations will occur during conflict, as well as their likelihood of being sincere (and thus more likely to end a war) or insincere (and thus more likely to promote the war effort). I support my claims using a combination of statistical analysis of daily-level data on fighting and negotiating over two centuries of interstate war. My work challenges an assumption held by both scholars and practitioners that it "cannot hurt" for third-party actors to promote diplomacy during war and contradicts a long-standing belief in international relations research that wartime negotiations are a mechanical reflection of the battlefield that have no strategic value beyond ending hostilities.